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Abstract 
This chapter is about international law incompatibility with ethnic conflicts. It 
stands against conventional wisdom by asserting that individualist international 
law is not a competent device to address the group phenomena of ethnic conflicts. 
The premise of this paper is that international law in its present form is not 
capable of responding to ethnic conflicts effectively. This position is based on 
four apparently independent arguments which taken together demonstrate 
compelling rationale for this assertion. First, international law does not generally 
recognize group rights. Second, liberal-individualism, the guiding philosophy of 
international law, cannot be effectively utilized for addressing group-needs and 
consequently, group-resentments. Third, ethnic conflict is a group phenomenon; 
therefore, it is the group that matters in ethnic conflicts. Finally, group-focused 
mechanisms such as consociationalism or ethnic federalism, which have been 
employed to demonstrably accommodate group claims and contain conflict 
potentials, are not, in fact, compatible with international law as they contradict a 
number of individualist human rights norms. Thus, taken together, these four 
arguments substantiate the thesis: on the one hand, there is no recognition of 
group rights in international law, and on the other hand, without recognizing 
group rights, international law has few means to prevent ethnic conflicts. This 
chapter explains this inherent drawback of international law vis-à-vis ethnic 
conflicts.  
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1. Prologue 
As of 2001, there are 275 sizeable minority groups in the world that 
have been targets of discrimination or are organized for political assertiveness or 
both, and taken together these groups involve a sixth of the world’s population. 
Of these politically active groups, 30 are in the Western democracies.1 Some of 
these groups have already been engaged in violent conflicts. Ethnic conflicts in 
other parts of the world do not need any separate mention. How effectively does 
302  
 
international law respond to such grave and contemporary issues, which afflict 
both Northern and Southern Hemispheres? Although most of the issues involved 
in the process of ethnic conflicts somehow fall under the rubric of international 
law, does international law contain effective mechanisms to deal with these 
issues? And, are the existing practices for containing ethnic tensions in many 
plural societies are compatible with international law? This article deals with 
these research questions. 
The premise of this chapter is that international law in its present form is 
not capable of responding to ethnic conflicts effectively. This position is based on 
four apparently independent arguments which taken together demonstrate 
compelling rationale for this assertion. First, international law does not generally 
recognize group rights. Second, liberal-individualism, the guiding philosophy of 
international law, cannot be effectively utilized for addressing group-needs and 
consequently, group-resentments. Third, ethnic conflict is a group phenomenon; 
therefore, it is the group that matters in ethnic conflicts. Finally, group-focused 
mechanisms such as consociationalism or ethnic federalism, which have been 
employed to demonstrably accommodate group claims and contain conflict 
potentials, are not, in fact, compatible with international law as they contradict a 
number of individualist human rights norms. Thus, taken together, these four 
arguments substantiate the thesis: on the one hand, there is no recognition of 
group rights in international law, and on the other hand, without recognizing 
group rights, international law has few means to prevent ethnic conflicts. The 
following sections explain this inherent drawback of international law vis-à-vis 
ethnic conflicts. The argument developed in this chapter has been substantiated 
with a case study on conflict-torn Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of 
Bangladesh.  
 
2. Dispelling the Myth of ‘Group Rights’ in International Law 
International law is no longer the monopoly of States. While States are 
still the primary sources, which Oppenheim called the ‘normal subjects’, 2  of 
international law, they are no longer the exclusive sources or subjects. Although 
the legal personality of individuals and various international organizations is 
recognized in contemporary international law, ethno-cultural groups as such are 
not currently conferred international legal personality. Rather, the notion of 
‘group rights’ remains a myth within international law. Nonetheless, groups have 
enjoyed protection throughout history under international treaties and 
conventions; such protection can be grossly divided in the following phases: 
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A.  Treatment of Groups in the Pre-War Phase  
Among the first direct attempts at minority protection were measures to 
safeguard religious minorities. These first appeared in the 13th century and grew 
in importance as a result of the Reformation. One recent instrumental work by 
Goldsmith and Posner called such treaties ‘symmetric cooperative human rights 
law’, under which each State agreed to grant rights to minorities in its territory to 
protect its minority coethnics or coreligionists in another country.3 Despite the 
existence of such treaties, it cannot be said that a general system or mechanism for 
protection of group rights existed at that time. Firstly, these treaties basically 
dealt with religious communities only, instead of adopting a generalized principle 
for the protection of minority groups; secondly, no effective system was 
developed to ensure implementation; thirdly, this protection was not guided by 
any norm; and finally, these treaties were rarely implemented. Therefore, no 
general recognition of ‘group rights’ existed or even took root at that time; 
instead, these treaties were special in character. They were ad hoc as well as 
given to frequent change with territorial borders.  
 
B.  Short-lived Regime of Hybrid Rights in the Inter-War Period 
It is generally recognized that only in the aftermath of World War I that 
a system for the protection of minorities was established. A significant number of 
national minorities emerged as a result of the drastic redrawing of frontiers after 
the WW I, when new States were created or old ones enlarged. Hence the 
realization of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination was enormously 
complicated by the problem of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe 
where States were multi-national and nations were multi-State. Therefore, a 
system for the protection of minority rights was felt necessary for the groups who 
did not qualify for the right of self-determination. President Wilson, in his second 
draft of the League of Nations’ Covenant, inserted a provision requiring all ‘new 
States’ to accord to minorities the same treatment and security that is accorded to 
majorities.4 In the third draft, the proposed Article was widened to include ‘all 
States’ seeking admission to the League.5 However, this article, which could have 
opened a new era, failed to be adopted in the Covenant. According to Thornberry, 
“[t]he Wilson clauses were more than rules against discrimination […]. They 
included collective rights. As a general formula, this approach, interposing 
minorities as collectivities with special claims on the State, provoked general 
resistance.”6 Thus, instead of recognizing group rights as a general principle in 
the Covenant, the allied and associated powers preferred to conclude a series of 
minority treaties, applicable between contracting parties alone. In the face of 
Germany’s exclusionary laws that outraged every standard the League attempted 
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to uphold, there was little that the League could do, except in Upper Silesia which 
was under minority protection. Dorothy V. Jones even questions the very 
intention of minority treaties, which in her opinion were formed to maintain 
political stability in Europe and not for the protection of minorities per se. 7 
However, there is no doubt that this regime essentially opened up a potential 
avenue for further development of group rights, however, State-powers failed to 
pursue this opportunity. With that, the minority rights regime of the League 
remained a short-lived experiment. 
 
C.  Dominance of a New Philosophy in the Post- WW II Phase  
Experience with the ambivalent nature of minority issues during the 
inter-war period made the whole project of minority rights questionable. The 
loyalty issue of minority groups towards their country of residence had been an 
issue of grave concern in the aftermath of the WWII, which compelled world 
leaders to think of minority rights in a different way. In fact, the concept of a 
human rights regime exclusively centred on the rights of the individuals, based on 
an individualistic approach common to western liberal philosophy, was widely 
accepted as a preferred means of addressing related issues. This approach has 
remained dominant since post-WWII. Joseph Kunz put this shift towards 
individualistic liberal idea of human rights in an interesting manner in 1954: 
 
He who dedicates his life to the study of international law in 
these troubled times is sometimes stuck by the appearance as if 
there were fashions in international law just as neckties. At the 
end of the First World War, “international protection of 
minorities” was the great fashion […]. Recently this fashion 
has become nearly obsolete. Today the well-dressed 
international lawyer wears “human rights.”8  
 
Throughout the entire regime of human rights under the UN, the idea of 
group rights has been carefully avoided. The UN Charter, for example, does not 
contain rights for groups. In theory this omission was addressed by the creation of 
the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities - a subordinate body of the Commission on Human Rights. This action 
represents a compromised arrangement. It should be noted, the same approach 
was taken in the League Covenant. Although initially two Sub-commissions were 
proposed - one for the ‘prevention of discrimination’ and the other for the 
‘protection of minorities’ - the Commission in 1947 decided to form one Sub-
commission with the task of both prevention and protection.9 However, due to the 
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member-States’ lack of interest in the protection issue, the Sub-commission 
decided to focus on the prevention of discrimination.10 In 1965, it was proposed 
that the name of the Sub-Commission should be changed to the ‘Permanent 
Committee of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights.11 In 1979 again, the 
Sub-Commission recommended that its name be changed to the Sub-Commission 
on Human Rights.12 Apparently, there is a broad-based prejudice against the term 
‘minority’. Also, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of 
non-discrimination prevailed without any reference to group rights. In the 
drafting process of the Declaration, the Sub-commission proposed an article on 
minority rights which was vehemently opposed by the majority members in the 
Commission and the General Assembly.13 US Representative Eleanor Roosevelt 
explicitly declared that there should be no minority provision in the Declaration, 
and opined that “the best solution of the problem of minorities was to encourage 
respect for human rights.”14 The General Assembly, consequently, adopted the 
UDHR without any provision for minority rights; instead, requested the Council 
to ask the Commission and the Sub-Commission to make a thorough study of the 
problems of minorities. Once again, the claim for group rights was compromised 
and compensated with a toothless measure. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights followed the 
same path, although it recognized group identity very cautiously and in a limited 
way in Article 27.15 The phrase ‘in community with the other members of their 
groups’ of the Article indicates a community requirement. To this extent, it can 
be perceived as recognition of group identity within the individualistic framework 
of the Covenant. However, it failed to be accepted as a general principle. The 
travaux preparatoires of the Covenant demonstrates the resistance of the member 
States to the insertion of group rights.16 Therefore, in the final text, we find the 
‘persons belonging to such minorities’, not the minorities themselves, as the 
subject of this right. This specific wording was utilized, as the minorities were 
not the subjects of international law.17 Thornberry clearly describes this tension 
between individual and group rights in the Article: “The balance between 
‘minority rights’ and ‘individual rights’ is an aspect of a larger question, but it is 
resolved in the Covenant in favour of individual rights. The minority’s ‘claim’ on 
individuals, even in the case of a minority in difficulties of self-preservation, has 
only a secondary or subordinate importance.”18 Besides, this Article applies only 
to “those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist”. 19 
Throughout the drafting process, some representatives of States denied any 
applicability of this provision in their States since they did not have any minority; 
some representatives called it merely a ‘standard’.20 Therefore, Article 27 cannot 
be taken as a general principle of international law fairly because, according to 
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Thornberry, “it would be an odd claim that a State is somehow bound by a 
‘general principle of law’ if it has consistently rejected that principle as one of 
customary international law.”21   
 
D.  Subsequent Development 
Certain subsequent instruments attempted to address group identity 
within the individualistic framework of international law. For example, the 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), and the UN 
Declaration against Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and 
Belief (1981) provide group focused rights, especially in the form of affirmative 
action. While this change in attitude can be perceived as a pragmatic measure for 
addressing group needs, it cannot be taken, however, as a general recognition of 
group rights. Affirmative action presupposes the existence of groups, and this 
measure is available to persons because of their group affiliation. This 
understanding of affirmative action apparently stands against a liberal approach, 
and consequently, liberals have tended to justify this measure by calling it a 
transitory provision. Once all the citizens become equal, there will be no such 
special measures required for any group. This approach contains a profound 
error; the assumption that any given group wishes to maintain its culture on a 
temporary basis!  
 The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) is a significant document in 
the post cold war phase, which recognizes the necessity of ‘protection’ of 
minorities. However, being a Declaration, this document has no binding effect on 
the signatory States. Moreover, taken as a whole, this Declaration did not go 
beyond the traditional liberal-individualistic approach of international human 
rights law. The very title of the Declaration indicates this fact. The legacy of the 
ICCPR is quite evident here. Similarly, the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities preferred the Framework Convention to the Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights put forward by the Parliamentary 
Assembly. Pentassuglia comments that  
 
[t]he relevant OSCE work is not based on the notion of 
enforcing human and minority rights across the board in the 
name of democracy, but on the more ambiguous concept that 
certain situation must be contained in one way or another as 
they threaten to develop into armed conflict - somewhat a relay 
of the League of Nation’s approach in 1920s.22  
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Despite these developments, the notion of group rights has yet to be 
generally recognized in international law. Additionally, as long as liberalism 
exclusively dominates the plane of international law, there will be no such 
recognition of group rights. 
 
3. Liberal Shortcomings apropos Group Rights 
With the emergence of liberal ideology as a dominant philosophy in the 
international arena, the idea of minority rights was widely perceived to be 
redundant. Rather, it was believed that liberal-individualism could effectively 
guarantee necessary protections for various minority groups, regardless of the 
basis for association; religious, linguistic, cultural or ethnic. The outbreak of 
ethnic resentment or even conflicts in Western democracies demonstrably 
indicates the fallacy of this proposition. Accordingly, some liberal theorists has 
revisited the entire concept of liberal-individualism in order to establish an 
accommodative framework to acknowledge that there are compelling interests 
related to culture and identity which are fully consistent with liberal principles of 
freedom and equality, and which justify granting special rights to minorities. Will 
Kymlicka’s liberal culturalist position is a pertinent example.23 His argument, in 
short, is that modern states invariably develop and consolidate a ‘societal 
culture’ 24  which requires the standardization and diffusion of a common 
language, and the creation and diffusion of common educational, political, and 
legal institutions. To ensure freedom and equality for all citizens involves, inter 
alia, ensuring that they have equal membership in, and access to, the 
opportunities made available by the societal culture. But in the case of national 
minorities, the case is quite different.25 These groups already possessed a societal 
culture and they have fought to maintain these institutions. Freedom for them 
involves the ability to live and work in their own societal culture. In short, the 
aim of a liberal theory of minority rights is to define fair terms of integration for 
immigrants, and to enable national minorities to maintain themselves as distinct 
societies. However, Kymlicka’s ‘liberal’ position has been dismantled by other 
liberals. Chandran Kukathas, for example, finds it unnecessary to accommodate 
any idea of group rights to address the issues of minority. To quote him: “We 
need, rather, to reassert the fundamental importance of individual liberty and 
individual rights and question the idea that cultural minorities have collective 
rights.”26 This proposition heavily depends on Kukathas’s assumption that the 
basis of collective rights is the rights of individuals, which is again debatable. 
Another eminent liberal philosopher - Brian Barry - strikes at the very root of 
Kymlicka’s ‘liberal’ understanding. He is critical of Kymlicka’s emphasis on 
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‘diversity’ and ‘autonomy’, for they refer to policies that would systematically 
enfeeble precisely those rights of individuals to protection against groups that 
liberal States should guarantee. That the State does not lend any special weight to 
the norms of illiberal - or liberal - groups, is, according to him, the essence of 
what it means to say that a society is a liberal society.27 And then he poses the 
relevant question: “How can a theory that would gut liberal principles be a form 
of liberalism?”28 His expression is more candid when he says: “If liberal is not 
somebody who believes that liberalism is true (with or without inverted commas), 
what is a liberal?”29 He consequently refuses to recognize Kymlicka as a liberal 
on the grounds that: 
 
A theory that has the implication that nationalities (whether 
they control a state or a sub-state polity) have a fundamental 
right to violate liberal principles is not a liberal theory of group 
rights. It is an illiberal theory with a bit of liberal hand-writing 
thrown in as an optional extra.30 
 
 Western democracies have a long standing practice of granting 
differentiated treatment for national minorities, but on the other hand, liberalism 
as a theory does not recognize this group phenomenon of rights. Kymlicka’s 
theory, developed within a liberal framework, aimed to fill this gap between 
theory and practice. But at the end it was found incompatible with liberalism. 
This shortcoming of liberal philosophy as a matter of fact endorses Vernon Van 
Dyke’s communitarian proposition that “liberalism needs supplementing”.31  
 International law response to group rights is an archetypical illustration 
of liberal response to groups. For pragmatic reasons, of course, international law 
sometimes accommodates rights for groups without setting any general norm in 
favour of group rights in exactly the same way liberal democracies devolve rights 
to groups without recognizing the norm. Like liberal democracies, modern human 
rights law also accommodates affirmative action policies with clear assertion that 
these rights are temporary in nature and they shall not be continued after the 
objectives have been achieved.32 If these policies are to truly protect a culture, 
then they must be permanent; but the problem is that, as of theory, it is not 
possible to accommodate such group-differentiated practice within liberal-
individualism. When it comes to serious issues like ethnic conflicts where group 
identity, group rights, and group politics are the key factors, international law has 
a dearth of options available. Current international law scholars deal with 
significant matters in a piecemeal manner, addressing issues such as citizenship, 
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genocide, territorial claims, or self-determination in its narrowest forms. Thus, 
the key problem remains unaddressed. 
 
4. Group Phenomenon of Ethnic Conflicts 
International law does not generally recognize group rights, and as long 
as liberal-individualism remains its guiding philosophy, international law cannot 
accommodate group rights. This has been our central argument in the preceding 
sections. On the other hand, ethnic conflict develops primarily via three means; 
either group identity (in a primordial sense) or group interest (in an instrumental 
sense) or as a combination of both (in a constructive sense). Therefore, it is the 
group that matters in ethnic conflict. This group phenomenon of ethnic conflicts 
is evident in a number of instrumental and constructive theories of ethnic conflict. 
Caselli and Coleman’s perception of ethnic conflict as a competition for 
economic resources is premised on the assumption that if the population is 
ethnically heterogeneous, coalitions can be formed along ethnic lines, and ethnic 
identity can therefore be used as a marker to recognize potential infiltrators to the 
winning coalition. 33  This premise essentially incorporates a race element. 
Similarly, Amy Chua gives an account of how globalization has created ethnic 
hatred in many parts of the non-Western world by creating a market dominant 
ethnic minority (through economic globalization) and empowering an 
impoverished majority (through the democratic process). 34  A group factor is 
demonstrably evident here. While such instrumental theories assume that ethnic 
conflicts are the creation of power-/resources-hungry elites, they do not answer 
why the followers follow. Horowitz deals with this issue plausibly with his 
‘theory of group entitlement’ - that “[r]elative group worth and relative group 
legitimacy […] merge into a politics of ethnic entitlement”. 35  Hence ethnic 
conflicts are the results of incompatible claims of group entitlements. The point 
to be noted here is that group worth and group legitimacy, the two key concepts 
of Horowitz’s theory, have been put in relative terms. In other words, a group’s 
worth and legitimacy is determined in relation to other group(s). Therefore, it is 
group comparison that marks group worth and group legitimacy. Ethnic conflict 
develops on these three group-centric concepts. Similarly, group factor is crucial 
in Harff and Gurr’s framework for analysis of ethnopolitical mobilization and 
conflict: 
 
[A] people who strongly identify with their ethnic brethren and 
who live in an autocratic political system with low international 
economic status, one that has used discrimination and 
intermittent violence to repress its ethnic peoples, are the most 
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likely to challenge their oppressors. The conflict potential is 
greatest if the group is cohesive and has traditional (autocratic) 
leaders who enjoy the widespread support of international 
organizations and actors.36 
  
While the instrumental theory of Chua perceives ethnicity as a mobilization 
tool of demagogues, Milton Esman’s theory explains ethnic conflicts as a 
phenomenon where both the instrumental and primordial issues become 
intermingled; thus he asserts: “[C]onflicts, whether waged peacefully or 
violently, reflect genuine and often incompatible demands of the contending 
parties.”37 With this understanding, Esman identifies three causes that precipitate 
ethnic conflicts, and here again, we can identify the group dynamics. The first 
such cause of ethnic conflict is perceived affronts to a community’s honour or 
dignity; second, tangible threats to the vital interests of an ethnic community by 
another ethnic group or by a government; and the third precipitator is fresh 
opportunities to gain advantages or redress grievances to upset an unsatisfactory 
status quo that had previously been considered impervious to change.38 
 There is no exhaustive list of ethnic conflict theories, nor are all the 
theories that we have referred to here perfect. Our purpose was to underscore the 
fact that although various scholars with different backgrounds address the issue 
of ethnic conflicts from various perspectives, the group has been the key thrust of 
their theories. Ethnic conflicts are a group phenomenon and no individualist 
approach bypassing this group focus can effectively respond to such concerns. 
Therefore, in sharply divided societies, pragmatism inspired political actors  have 
developed group-focused mechanisms like ethnic federalism or consociationalism 
to handle ethnic tensions. While this widespread practice of power-sharing is 
evident, is it compatible with international law? The following section examines 
this issue to once again highlight the inherent theoretical limitations of 
individualist international law when incorporating power-sharing tools to respond 
to group dynamics of ethnic conflicts.    
 
5. International Law Compatibility with Power-sharing Arrangements 
Power-sharing have offered a number of avenues for maintaining peace 
or at least containing conflict potentials in a number of plural societies. These 
mechanisms have their own limitations, yet in ethnically divided societies they 
constitute a more rational approach than majoritarian rule. Although the tendency 
of imperilling national unity has been a key criticism of these power-sharing 
methods, in many plural societies power-sharing has been instrumental in 
keeping already-divided groups together. Nigeria is an oft-cited case in this 
311 
 
context. Nevertheless, the widespread practice of power-sharing in plural 
societies is not always compatible with international law; in fact, a good number 
of international law scholars found these power-sharing mechanisms a flagrant 
violation of established universal legal norms. Wippman, for example, argues that 
in general, power-sharing mechanisms tend to favour collective rights over 
individual rights, as a result of which many of such practices appear 
discriminatory when viewed from a liberal individualist perspective.39 From an 
individual rights standpoint, he identifies at least three specific human rights 
norms that are infringed by power-sharing practices: 
  
First, they explicitly differentiate among the members of groups 
on the basis of characteristics such as race, religion, and 
language rather than on neutral merit-based criteria. Second, 
ethnic power-sharing practices may dilute the political power of 
individuals who are not members of a protected ethnic group 
and thereby violate their participatory rights. Finally, at least 
some of the autonomy schemes […] would place restrictions on 
efforts by members of some ethnic groups to settle in areas 
controlled by members of another ethnic group, arguably in 
violation of the right to freedom of movement and residence.40 
 
Where power-sharing devices are used to confer power on particular 
groups in excess of what is reasonably necessary to protect their interests and in 
ways that are designed to deny other groups meaningful participation in the 
governance of the State, it may be taken as a form of racism and violation of 
international human rights covenants. For example, under the 1990 Fijian 
Constitution, indigenous Fijians are guaranteed a working majority of seats in the 
legislature and primacy in the selection of the President and the Prime Minister. 
As a result, Fijians of Indian origin - the majority group - are permanently 
reduced to a secondary political status, along with other non-indigenous Fijians.41 
This Fijian arrangement is a violation of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), for this clearly 
constitutes an ethnic or racial distinction that impairs the right of non-indigenous 
Fijians to exercise their right of political participation. 42  Moreover, it cannot 
qualify as a permissible special measure under the CERD as it leads to the 
maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups 43  Additionally, the 
Convention also requires that special measures be discontinued after the 
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. Similarly, ethnic 
federalism, as a power-sharing tool, may be considered a violation of the 
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International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, which bans the segregation of groups based on race or ethnicity.44 
Moreover, the power-sharing aspects of consociationalism come in direct conflict 
with established norms incorporated in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights mandating equal rights of political participation for all, which include the 
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections, and the right to have access to, on general 
terms of equality, to public service in the country. Consociational arrangements 
essentially violate these rights of the members of majority community by 
providing minority ethnic groups political power disproportionate to their number 
through reserved seats and offices, minority veto rights, or similar devices.45 And 
finally, territory based autonomy for a particular ethnic group restricts the 
individual right of the rest of the residents to freedom of movement and residence 
stipulated in Article 12 (1) of the ICCPR. Similar provisions can also be found in 
Article 13 of the UDHR and Protocol No. 4, Article 2 (1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Henry Steiner deals with a broader aspect; autonomy for ethnic minorities, 
according to him, weakens the common humanity. “[E]xtreme manifestations of 
ethnic bonds will become the cardinal obstacle to a human rights consciousness, 
at least with respect to attitudes of members of the ethnic group toward the 
‘other’”.46    
 Despite such violations of the aforesaid international human rights 
instruments from an individualist perspective, Wippman is of the opinion that 
from a group perspective, power-sharing arrangements like consociationalism or 
ethnic federalism are not ipso facto violations of established human rights norms, 
and they are compatible with international human rights law. He argues that 
consociational practices should be viewed not as creating separate or 
discriminatory rights for ethnic minorities but as enabling ethnic minorities to 
exercise their rights on a level as close to parity with dominant groups thereby 
ensuring the equality of groups.47 However, he takes note of the limitations of 
group-oriented equality within an individualist framework of the ICCPR: “It 
might be possible to interpret general ‘terms of equality’ broadly enough to 
encompass political systems that focus on the equality of groups rather than of 
individuals, in keeping with present trends toward recognition of collective rights, 
but such an interpretation seems inconsistent with the predominantly individual 
rights focus of the Covenant itself.”48 Therefore, it would be particularly difficult 
to establish the compatibility of group focused power-sharing mechanisms with 
the liberal individualist international human rights regime. Mere existence of 
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power-sharing practices does not ipso facto provide legality to those practices - a 
fact which reiterates the gap between theory and practice in international law. In 
this connection, Wippman was right in ultimately developing his justifications for 
power-sharing from a “purely pragmatic standpoint,” 49  as evidenced by his 
concluding comment: “[Power-sharing practices] may compromise some human 
rights ideals, but they may also help avoid the even greater injustices associated 
with other possible solutions.”50  We rephrase his remark this way: power-sharing 
devices are the most viable means of addressing injustices towards ethnic 
minorities and thereby minimizing the potential for ethnic conflicts, but 
unfortunately these group focused mechanisms are inherently incompatible with 
established liberal individualist norms of international law.  
 
6. Case Study on the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the southeastern part of Bangladesh, 
with hills, cascades and woods, have added sublimity to the illustrious natural 
beauty of Bangladesh, and the indigenous ethnic minorities and their colourful 
way of life are at the heart of the beauties of the CHT. In the hills, it is not only 
the landscapes that are dramatically different from the plains, but the features of 
the original inhabitants are also strikingly different from the overwhelming 
majority of Bengali people. More or less, there are thirteen indigenous 
communities in the CHT (Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachari Hill Districts); 
they are: Chakma, Murma, Tangchangya, Tripura, Murang, Mrung, Bawm, 
Pangkhua, Lushai, Khumi, Khyang, Mru, and Sak.51 However, the constitution of 
the People’s Republic of Bangladesh does not recognize the existence of any 
other communities other than the dominant Bengali majority.  
 
A.  Indigenous Peoples – the Victims of the Nation Building Mission 
Immediately after attaining independence, when the war-ravaged 
Bangladesh Government was preparing to adopt a constitution, a hill peoples’ 
delegation led by Manobendra Narayan Larma called on Bangabandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman on February 15, 1972 demanding autonomy for the CHT with 
its own legislature. But this demand was utterly rejected; he rather insisted that 
there could be only ‘one nation’ in Bangladesh. Bangabandhu therefore 
reportedly asked the hill people to forget their separate identity and “become 
Bangalees”.52  
 
After the brutal assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15th August 
1975, martial law was imposed all over Bangladesh; this was the crucial event in 
the history of Bangladesh. During the regime of the military ruler General Ziaur 
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Rahman, the CHT Development Board headed by military personnel was formed 
in 1976. The Board undertook a devastating programme of settlement of 
hundreds of thousands of poor Bangalee people in the CHT. From 1980 to 1984, 
as many as 400,000 Bangalees were made to settle in the CHT, and over 50,000 
Chakmas are reported to have fled to the Indian state of Tripura.53 In 1947 the 
Bangalee population in the CHT was 2.5 %. It rose to 10% in 1951 and 35% in 
1981.54 The Bangalee population became almost 50% in 1991. In the Bandarban 
and Khagrachari hill districts, Bangalees are in majority where they account for 
53 % and 52% of the total population respectively. 55  This effort of forced 
assimilation is not limited to demographic calculations only; hill people are being 
suppressed culturally as well. Bangla, the state language of the country, is used as 
the only language in the schools in the CHT. In this nation building process, a 
number of indigenous languages are being wiped out. Massacre of indigenous 
people, burning of their houses, arbitrary arrests, torture, extra-judicial executions 
and ‘disappearances’ reportedly perpetrated by or with the connivance of the 
military and law enforcement agencies during the years of armed conflict depict 
the human rights situation in the region. In 1990, information from one refugee 
camp in India indicated that one in every ten of the total population had been a 
victim of rape in the CHT, and over 94% of the alleged cases of rape of the hill 
women were by security forces.56 Arbitrary arrest and inhuman and degrading 
treatment of the hill people was a routine work during the period of insurgency. 
These were planned actions as a part of macro objective of nation building 
through forced assimilation and forced expulsion.  
 
B.  Decades of Insurgency and the CHT Peace Accord 
 Immediately following the independence of Bangladesh from autocratic 
rule of Pakistan in 1971, the CHT underwent militarization. On 7 March 1972 
under the leadership of Manobendra Narayan Larma, the PCJSS (CHT United 
People’s Party) was formed. The party also added a military wing, the SB (peace 
army), to it. To counter the moves of the SB, in the name of ‘national security’ 
government subsequently embarked upon the militarization of the CHT. The 
situation turned worse after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib in 
August 1975 which was followed by two martial law regimes spread over 15 
years. The CHT issue was identified as a ‘national security’ problem, and a large 
number of the Bangladesh army and police forces was deployed in the region to 
carry out extensive search and destroy operations.57 The Bangladesh Air Force 
also carried out raids in northern and southern CHT.58 During this period, the 
CHT was under direct and exclusive control of the army. The PCJSS was 
outlawed. Alarmed by the developments, Larma crossed over to India, and 
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subsequently the SB – the military wing – emerged as the main vanguard of the 
Hill People’s cause. In other words, the CHT issue came to be addressed by both 
sides with a military approach. 
 The CHT provided the Bangladesh military with a sense of mission and 
purpose. The army’s activities in the CHT were projected as nation-building 
endeavours, and were used to justify the rapid increases made in the Bangladesh 
Army both in terms of personnel and revenue receipts. 59  Apart from the 
militarization and total control of the CHT, the military has also committed gross 
violations of human rights in the region. Massacres, rape, forced religious 
conversion, religious persecution, forced eviction, arrests, torture, and kidnapping 
are some of the human rights violations by military personnel. Since 1980 there 
have been eleven major instances of massacre of the hill people by Bengali 
settlers and security personnel in which around 2000 hill men died.60  
 Meanwhile the PCJSS through its ideological and organizational 
framework undertook to organize the hill people on a nationalistic agenda. The 
persecution in the CHT led to the demand by the PCJSS for a separate nationhood 
for the hill people. This party, formed in the wake of Sheikh Mujib’s refusal in 
1972 to recognize the hill people as a community distinct from Bengalis, had 
since the mid 1980s been referring to the hill people as the ‘Jumma nation’.61 The 
party’s nationalistic agenda has been explicitly spelt out in its manifesto, where it 
states that the party’s main objective is to achieve the right of self-determination 
of the various small nationalities in the CHT with a separate entity status of the 
CHT with a constitutional guarantee. It recognises that the CHT is the homeland 
of various multi-lingual nationalities, who together have been referred to as the 
Jumma people. Mohsin explained the elements of Jumma nationalism: first, the 
word ‘Jumma’ has its origin in jhum, which has been the traditional mode of 
cultivation of the hill people. It was used pejoratively by Bengalis to denote the 
hill people as primitive and backward farmers. But for the hill people jhum 
constituted not only a mode of cultivation but also a way of life. It was integral to 
their religious, social and cultural ethos. The PCJSS therefore has invoked this 
particular nomenclature to infuse to the hill people with a sense of pride in their 
past, their traditional system and values which have been the objects of repeated 
onslaughts by outsiders. This nostalgia for the past, on the one hand creates 
images of ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ among the hill people, and on the other 
provides them with a sense of community and unity. Second, jhum also denotes 
the special relationship of the hill people to their land. It introduces a territorial 
dimension in this construction which assumes that the CHT had traditionally been 
the land of the hill people and need to be protected from outsiders. Third, an 
important element of Jumma nationalism is its emphasis on the separateness or 
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distinctiveness of the hill people from Bengalis. In this context, according to the 
PCJSS, jhum denotes the economic separateness of the hill people from the plain 
land Bengalis. Fourth, the PCJSS also emphasises and highlights the cultural 
separateness of the hill people from Bengalis. In linguistic terms they emphasise 
that Bengali is not their mother tongue. In religious terms they stress that Islam is 
not their religion. Finally, the PCJSS maintains that the shared experiences of 
deprivation and exploitation and the recent struggle of the hill people against 
Bengalis have created awareness among the hill people that they share a unique 
historical past. This has instilled in them a common bondage and feeling of 
oneness.62 Accordingly, with a view to realising Jumma nationalism by way of 
autonomy for the hill people, during the period of insurgency the PCJSS set out a 
number of demands: i) the Constitution of Bangladesh shall recognise the CHT as 
a special administrative unit, with regional autonomy. The three districts of the 
CHT shall be merged into one unit, and the region shall be renamed Jummaland; 
ii) Jummaland shall be administered by an autonomous Regional Council, which 
shall be elected directly by the people on the basis of adult franchise. The Council 
shall be responsible for 30 subjects including, inter alia, general administration, 
law and order, police, land, education, forestry, local government institutions, and 
cultural affairs; iii) all lands in the CHT, except some important government 
establishment, shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the Council. A 
constitutional ban ought to be put on the purchase of land in the CHT by 
‘outsiders’. Deeds made to lease out land to Bengalis for rubber plantation and 
forestry shall be cancelled and the lands shall be placed under the Council’s 
jurisdiction. The Constitution must ban Bengali settlements in the region. All 
‘outsiders’ who have settled in the area since 17 August 1947 shall be withdrawn 
from the region; iv) service rules shall be relaxed for the hill people. Special 
quotas shall be reserved in government civil services for the hill people; v) 
parliament seats of this constituency shall be reserved for the hill people only; vi) 
an autonomous indigenous Police Force constituting solely of the hill people shall 
be formed. Quotas should be reserved in the defence services for the hill people. 
The region shall be demilitarised; vii) a constitutional recognition shall be given 
to all the small nationalities of the area; and finally, viii) all international and 
internal Jumma refugees should be properly rehabilitated. Members of the SB and 
all individuals who have been implicated for association with the former should 
be properly rehabilitated.63 
 This power-sharing demand of the PCJSS as a whole was perceived as a 
threat to national security by military and conservative political elites. The 
political government in 1993 rejected the power-sharing demand by holding that 
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Bangladesh is an integrated and homogenous society bound by 
common language and rich cultural heritage. […] Bangladesh is 
a unitary state with a democratic Constitution that extends to 
the entire territory without exception.64 
 
This official stand perceives Bangladesh as a nation-state. By claiming 
Bangladesh a homogenous society, this position denies the existence of other 
cultural groups, and justifies various assimilative actions taken by successive 
governments. However, situation changed in 1997 with the re-emergence of 
another political party – Bangladesh Awami League – to power. This was the 
party that led the country during the liberation war in 1971,and historically, it had 
strong relationship with neighbouring India. During this time, the government 
took sincere efforts to bring an end to the insurgency by initiating dialogues with 
PCJSS. Government also sought cooperation from India who allegedly provided 
SB with arms and other supports during the whole period of the insurgency. In 
response, Indian government clearly indicated to the SB that it has to withdraw its 
bases from the Indian soil. This single fact considerably influenced PCJSS to 
soften its demand for regional autonomy; instead, during the negotiations with the 
government, it accepted the government position that the three hill districts of the 
CHT – Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Banderban – will form a regional council.65 
Following closed-door negotiations, the CHT Peace Accord between the National 
Committee on CHT Affairs formed by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of Bangladesh and the PCJSS appeared on December 2, 1997. On behalf of the 
government, the Convenor of the National Committee Hasanat Abdullah and on 
behalf of the inhabitants of the CHT, the president of the PCJSS Bodhipriya 
Larma alias Shantu Larma signed the Accord. 
 The Peace Accord responded, though half-heartedly, to the issues of 
local governance, rehabilitation, land, and general amnesty. The Accord provides 
for three Hill District Councils, wherein only the permanent residents of the CHT 
will be members.66 There is provision for a Regional Council in coordination with 
these District Councils. Chairman of this Council shall be elected indirectly by 
the elected members of the District Councils. The Regional Council shall be 
formed with 22 members of whom two-thirds will be elected from among the 
tribals. The Regional Council is given the responsibility of supervising and 
coordinating the subjects vested under the Hill District Councils. It is to be noted 
here that some major subjects like general administration and law and order, 
education, cultural affairs, information and statistics, population control and 
family planning that directly relate to autonomy and preserving indigenous 
culture were not vested under the Hill Districts. However, it was provided that the 
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government and elected representatives shall make efforts to maintain separate 
cultures and traditions of the tribals, and the government in order to develop the 
tribal cultural activities at the national level shall provide necessary patronisation 
and assistance. Regarding land issue, the Accord stipulates that no land within the 
boundaries of Hill District shall be given in settlement, purchased, sold and 
transferred, including giving lease without prior approval of the Council. Some 
government establishments are kept outside this restriction. The Accord also 
prohibits any acquisition and transfer of land within the boundaries of the Hill 
District by the government without consultation and consent of the Hill District 
Council. Provisions for rehabilitation, amnesty along with compensation were 
made in the Peace Accord. 
 However, to the dissatisfaction of the hill people, the Accord remained 
silent apropos their constitutional recognition. Instead, the term ‘tribal’ (the 
Bengali version of this word – Upajati – means sub-nation) was used to describe 
the indigenous peoples. The preamble categorically mentions that the parties of 
this Accord arrived on an agreement “under the framework of the constitution of 
Bangladesh”. In this connection, the following sub-section examines the CHT 
Peace Accord in light of the Constitution and within the theoretical framework 
developed in the earlier sections of this article.        
 
C. Compatibility of the CHT Peace Accord with the Constitution and 
International Human Rights Instruments 
  The constitution of Bangladesh, like any other liberal constitution, 
prohibits discrimination against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
sex or place of birth.67 To address the de facto economic and social disparity, the 
Constitution permits affirmative actions “in favour of women or children or for 
the advancement of any backward section of citizens”.68 Special measures for 
indigenous peoples have been justified under this constitutional provision since 
the inception of Bangladesh by putting them under the rubric of ‘backward 
section of citizens’. It would be pertinent to mention here that during British 
colonial rule also the special characteristics of life and nature of the hill people of 
the CHT were also protected. The 1900 Regulation formulated by the British 
rulers is still considered the principal instrument for protecting hill people’s 
rights. However, in the unitary state of Bangladesh, the Constitution avoided any 
mention of indigenous people; instead, limited as well as insufficient affirmative 
measures were given validity by calling them a backward section of citizens. No 
doubt, centuries of systematic oppression and discrimination made hill people 
vulnerable, and economic affirmative action is badly needed to ameliorate their 
economic status. But perceiving them as backward in terms of culture and 
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tradition is nothing short of cultural hegemony by the dominant Bengali cultural 
group. Moreover, unlike economic issues, affirmative measures for protecting 
indigenous culture and tradition must be of permanent character which is not 
theoretically possible. Any such permanent discrimination, though positive and 
required, theoretically challenges the fundamental tenets of liberalism as we have 
seen in Section 3. Unless and until the very notion of ‘equality’ is redefined in the 
Constitution going beyond the liberal paradigm, no special measure for the 
protection and promotion of indigenous culture and tradition will be compatible 
with the Constitution. In this light, the Peace Accord is a deviation from liberal 
philosophy enshrined in the Constitution.  
 Besides, special arrangements to facilitate political participation of hill 
peoples by restricting a number of human rights of majority Bengalis contradict, 
among others, a number of international human rights instruments including 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.69    
 Paradoxically, the legality of peace agreements under the constitution or 
international law is not usually the prime concern of various contending parties of 
conflicts. Often, such agreements are the products of grave pragmatic needs in the 
absence of any better option. The CHT Peace Accord of 1997 is not any 
exception here. In the face of insurgency and ensuing massive violation of human 
rights as well as various regional and international pressures on both the 
government and PCJSS, such a peace accord was a demand of time. The peace 
process appeared complicated when the then opposition party – a right-wing 
nationalist party – vehemently opposed any concessions in favour of the 
indigenous people, as that would go against the unitary spirit of Bangladeshi 
nationalism as well as the territorial integrity of the country. The party in power 
at that time also consistently emphasized the nation-state character of Bangladesh 
ab initio. Therefore, the CHT Peace Accord mainly concentrated on bringing an 
end to insurgency by devolving a few number of local governments, subject to 
newly established district and regional councils and rehabilitating the members of 
SB without addressing the root causes of the conflict. Yet right-wing political 
parties declared this accord unconstitutional and vowed to repeal it once they 
assumed power, which they actually did not – again for pragmatic reasons. On 
the other hand, a section of hill people too rejected the accord as a compromise 
and formed a political party – United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF) – to 
carry on the struggle for the ‘full autonomy’ of the CHT.70 Under such delicate 
circumstances, no substantive progress has been made in the implementation of 
the accord. In the meantime, taking the full advantage of absence of full-scale 
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insurgency, the Bengali army is now building necessary infrastructure to ensure 
access to remote places of the CHT and frequently conducting search operations 
for UPDF cadres. 
 Apropos implementation of the accord, parties have conflicting claims. 
While the government claims that 95 per cent of the accord has been 
implemented, the PCJSS claims the opposite. 71  The fact remains that at the 
administrative level the three district Councils have started functioning but no 
elections have been held to the councils, instead members and chairmen have 
been selected by the government from its own following. The government has not 
as yet framed the rules for the functioning of the Regional Council; consequently 
the RC remains ineffective.72 Although the accord provided for the withdrawal of 
all temporary military camps (around 400) from the CHT, government maintains 
that 75 such camps have been withdrawn (PCJSS figure is 35).73 Regarding land 
issues, a Land Commission that has been formed but the Commission has not 
started functioning yet. The PCJSS maintains that there was an unwritten 
understanding between the parties to the accord on the question of withdrawal of 
Bengali settlers from the CHT. The government on its part denies the existence of 
any unwritten agreement.74 Although there is no longer a full-scale insurgency, 
violence against the hill people is still prevalent. On August 26, 2003 Bengali 
settlers of the Mohalchhari sub-district under the Hill District of Khagrachari 
rampaged through nine villages inhabited by indigenous people. This eight-hour 
long attack that claimed at least one life, took place in the presence of the army 
and policemen.75 The hills people alleged that army and police stood by when the 
marauding gangs ransacked the villages.76 When Bengalis were torching a house, 
a policeman is reported to have said: “hurry up! We don’t have enough time.”77 
More than 400 houses, two Buddhist temples and three shops were set ablaze by 
the mob, and nine indigenous women including a wife and two teenage daughters 
of a hill man were gang-raped by the Bengali attackers.78 On September 2, 2003 
the Daily Star News reported: “Ration stopped for indigenous CHT refugees: 
Hills people irked as free supply to Bengali settlers continue.” The news report 
stated that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) had directed the CHT Affairs 
Ministry to stop rations for the refugees. This attitude of a coalition government 
that earned more than two-thirds majority in the parliament unambiguously 
reveals that peace is far away from the CHT. 
 To sum up, the CHT Peace Accord was concluded to address the 
pragmatic need of resolving decades-long insurgency in the region. In doing so, 
the negotiators had to deviate from the liberal framework of the Bangladesh 
constitution on a number of issues, perhaps because they had no other viable 
alternative. This analogy is true for international law as well. The group focused 
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incentives, though insufficient, provided in the accord violate a number of 
individualist international human rights norms as we have already discussed in 
Section 5. And, this prima facie deviation from liberal principle is justified in the 
name of pragmatism. It demonstrates the impotence of existing municipal and 
international laws, drawn upon liberal orthodoxy, in dealing with ethnic conflicts. 
This case study substantiates this argument developed in preceding Sections.        
 
7. Epilogue 
Despite efforts on community, regional, state, and international levels, 
the world today continues to be a violent place. Hardly a day passes that is not 
marked with deaths of innocents in violent ethnic conflicts - be it in Sudan, Iraq, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Lebanon et al. The world 
community has already experienced incredible tragedies both during large 
established wars, and numerous more small-scale conflicts. The worst forms of 
such ethnic conflicts in recent times may be found in Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia. This paper exhibits that international law, in its present form, lacks 
the mechanisms necessary to address this vital threat to humanity through its 
individualism. Koshy, having the same realization, describes proceedings 
involving the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict before the Human Rights Commission 
and the Sub-Commission in which almost exclusive attention was given to 
violations of core individual rights rather than to the ethnic and political 
structures giving rise to the conflict as such or to the related claims of some 
Tamil groups for an autonomy scheme.79 Similarly, Osaghae registers his distrust 
of an individualist system to manage ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.80 This is true for 
other conflict situations as well. Thus, the case is well made that time has come to 
develop more accommodative devices to address this issue. This chapter provides 
the rationale for this proposed regime change.   
In this sense, this chapter is a part of an ongoing process - a process 
which is expected to respond to real grievances of vulnerable groups in a more 
compassionate way going beyond the narrow scope of liberalism. Our 
contribution to this process, while humble, is made none-the-less with hope. 
Therefore, we do not draw any conclusion here; instead, we register our hope for 
a new beginning for a world where everyone will be afforded with equal dignity 
and honour for self-being as well as for each culture and tradition that gives 
proper meaning to humanity. 
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